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The consequences of
democratisation on Taiwan’s daily
press
Since the end of the 1980s, competition between papers has sharpened
Patricia R.S. Batto
1 Since the end of the 1980s, there has been a free press in Taiwan. Before then, the
newspapers had been muzzled for almost forty years by the Nationalist regime. On an
economic level, the abolition of controls has opened up the daily newspaper market to
competition; on a political level, it has made it possible for all shades of opinion to be
freely expressed.
2 This article seeks to examine the impact of the end of the controlling of the daily press
in Taiwan,  and more broadly,  the links between the liberalisation of  the press  and
Taiwan’s  transition  to  democracy.  After  a  brief  historical  summary,  the  situation
arising from liberalisation will be considered first of all through the emergence of Ziyou
shibao (The Liberty Times),  a daily which concentrates on « Taiwan » rather than the
« Republic of China ». Then we will  look at the flagship of one of the two big press
groups  on  the  island,  the  Lianhe  bao  (United  Daily  News),  and  its  relations  with  the
government. Lastly, ahead of the March 2004 elections, we will return to the positions
of the main newspapers on the island during the previous presidential campaign, in
2000,  at  the end of  which the Democratic  Progressive Party (Minjindang)  candidate,
Chen Shuibian, was elected President, and is now seeking a second term.
The establishment of baojin
3 The system of control over the press, or baojin1, set up by the Nationalist government
was  based  on  a  multiplicity  of  legal  arrangements,  and  it  is  difficult  to  date  its
establishment exactly. Generally this is accepted to be the date of a directive of the
Yuan executive, June 10 19512. Taiwan’s press was subject to legislation which flowed
on the one hand from the emergency regime in force on the island — especially the
martial law proclaimed on May 19 1949; backed up, on the other hand, by specific laws
on publications. The Nationalist regime, which had retreated from mainland China to
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Taiwan in 1949, justified the maintenance of emergency legislation by its claim to be
pursuing the civil  war against the communists in order to reconquer the mainland.
Article  11  of  the  martial  laws  restrained  the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights  and
liberties;  in  particular,  it  gave  the  military  authorities  the  power  to  suppress
newspapers,  magazines  and  other  printed  materials  « judged  to  be  detrimental  to
military affairs ». A whole set of measures were linked to the martial laws, some of
which dealt with the press.
4 Another important text concerning the press was the law on publications, promulgated
on April  9  19523.  This  law,  which was  revised to  make it  more  restrictive  in  1958,
allowed  the  government  to  close  a  daily  paper  definitively  and  to  impose  all  the
sanctions on publications — warnings, fines, suspension or stopping of publication — by
administrative means, which is to say without any judicial procedure4. This law fell into
disuse after 1988, but was not repealed until January 25 19995.
5 Baojin designates the entirety of the measures restraining freedom of the press:
• The limitation on the registration of new newspapers (xianzheng) was a de facto interdiction
on the creation of any new newspaper. There remained the possibility of buying and
transforming an existing title.
• The limitation on the pagination (xianzhang) of the existing dailies was fixed on December 1
1950 at one and a half sheets, or 6 pages for broadsheets6. The authorised pagination was
only increased three times: in September 1950 to two sheets, in April 1967 to two and a half
sheets, and in March 1974 to three sheets.
• The limitation on newspaper printing places (xianyin) assigned a single printing place to
each daily: the distribution area of each paper, starting from a single point of departure, was
thus limited.
6 Control of the press was exercise by various government organs, the two main ones
being the army and the Government Information Office (GIO), behind which the Central
Propaganda Department of the Guomindang was at work.
7 Up to January 1 1988, when the baojin was repealed, the number of dailies in Taiwan
remained constant at 317. From 1945 to 1959, the government press was dominant: first
it  was  the  Taiwan  xinsheng  bao ( Taiwan  Shin  Sheng  Daily  News),  published  by  the
provincial authorities which had the largest circulation8; then, from 1954, the flagship
of the Guomindang press, the Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News)9.  But very quickly,
private dailies got the upper hand. These dailies, tolerated in particular because the
Nationalist government was determined to put up a good show on the international
level  and  to  ensure  American  support,  did  not  belong  to  the  government,  to  the
Guomindang or to the army; but the authorities made sure that they were in the hands
of  the  regime’s  faithful.  In  a  symptomatic  way,  with  rare  exceptions,  most  of  the
newspapers  —  as  well  as  the  media  in  general  —  were  then  in  the  hands  of  of
Mainlanders (Waishengren)10. The private newspapers, which were not subsidised, were
concerned with commercial  profit:  thus,  in  1952,  the main private dailies  in Taipei
united  against  the  government  press  in  order  to  obtain  from  the  authorities the
publication of institutional advertising in their pages11.
8 The first private paper to develop was the Lianhe bao: on the eighth anniversary of its
creation, on September 16 1959, it  claimed to be the island’s leading daily over the
Zhongyang ribao, with a circulation of about 80,000.  A paper with a popular readership,
it differentiated itself from the organs of Nationalist propaganda, specialising in short
news items which the government dailies scorned. But it set itself apart in other ways:
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for example it decided to publish on its front page only important information about
Chiang  Kai-shek;  the  government  dailies  could  not  allow  themselves  such  an
innovation: they systematically published any news about the President on the front
page. To a certain extent, the obligation to be profitable, the need to sell, incited the
private papers to distance themselves from propaganda, while remaining within limits
acceptable to the regime, in order not to end up being closed down.
9 Baojin led to the constitution of two big private press groups in Taiwan, that of the
Lianhe bao12 and that of the Zhongguo shibao (China Times)13.  Jiang Jingguo, the son of
Chiang  Kai-shek,  brought  their  bosses,  Wang  Tiwu  and  Yu  Jizhong,  both  former
members of the Nationalist army, into the Central Committee of the Guomindang in the
1970s.
A growth in parallel with economic expansion
10 At the end of  the 1980s,  Taiwan’s  daily  press  was extremely modern.  Its  plant  and
technology  were  those  of  a  developed  country,  in  terms  of  writing,  editing  and
printing. Taiwan’s dailies were in colour: the first to equip itself with colour printing
facilities was the Zhongguo shibao, in March 196814. 
11 The growth of the Taiwanese press has paralleled economic expansion. The existence of
newspapers  calls  for  a  fairly  advanced  level  of  development,  particularly  at
infrastructure level. It also calls for a potential readership, which is to say a population
with high levels of education. One of the key factors in the Taiwanese « miracle » has
been the importance given to education, which put an end to illiteracy15.
12 With economic development,  Taiwanese society entered the mass consumption era,
and the advertising market went through a stunning expansion. Newspapers have two
major sources of revenue: sales to readers and advertising (small ads and commercial
advertising). The majority of Taiwan’s dailies draw most of their resources from the
latter:  in 1960, they attracted 62 % of advertising investment, and, in 1987, 41 %, as
against the 34 % accruing to television, which appeared on the island in 1962. Between
1960 and 1987,  the  advertising revenues  of  the  daily  press  went  from 102 to  9,665
million $NT16.  In the framework of a limited pagination, such a flood of advertising
obviously posed a problem. The dailies strove to meet it:  no space was wasted, and
advertising was to be found in the margins and even in the central folds of newspapers.
Moreover, a procedure called suoban (« page reduction »), mainly applied to small ads,
consisted of reducing the pointage of the characters. Over the years, the small ads were
composed  in  progressively  smaller  characters  until  they  became  tiny  and  almost
impossible to decipher. A second procedure (huanban, « changing pages ») consisted of
a multiplicity of local editions. Each paper published editions different with different
editorial content, as well as different small ads and different commercial advertising
(especially property advertisements)17. Finally, a third procedure, called fenban (« page
sharing »),  consisted  of  selling  the  same  advertising  space,  on  the  front  page  for
example, to two different advertisers, A and B ; half the papers printed would carry
advertisement  A  and the  other  half,  B ;  each sales  outlet  was  supplied  with  half  A
papers and half B. The abolition of baojin, by putting an end to limited pagination, also
finished off most of these practices.
13 Another  element  favoured  the  modernisation  of  the  Taiwanese  press:  the  Chinese
language. As long the composition of texts was still carried out manually, one character
at a time, the production conditions for publications in alphabetical languages and in
Chinese were about the same. But with the automation of composition, Chinese was
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penalised by its enormous number of characters18. The computerisation of Taiwanese
newspapers, which began in the early 1980s, made it possible to reduce the difference
in productivity between Chinese and the alphabetical languages19.
14 In the 1960s, when the Taiwanese economy took off, the total circulation of the daily
press doubled, from 680,000 copies in 1960 to 1.22 million in 197020,  and advertising
revenues increased fivefold, from 102 million $NT in 1960, they rose to 507 million in
1970.  The  appearance  and  content  of  the  dailies  improved,  because  of  plant
modernisation,  but  also  because  of  better  training  for  journalists.  The  government
press was losing ground. The Lianhe bao was the leading private newspaper in terms of
ciculation, closely followed by the Zhongguo shibao at the end of the decade.
15 In the 1970s, the total circulation of the daily press tripled, reaching 3.5 million copies
in 198021, while its advertising revenue increased eightfold over the decade to reach 4.4.
billion $NT in 1980. The Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao, which, in 1979 announced
that it had become the leading Taiwanese daily, shared most of the market. The success
of the Zhongguo shibao can be explained in particular by a more tolerant attitude than
that of the Lianhe bao in the face of increasing opposition to the Nationalist regime, at a
time when the Republic of China was being isolated on the diplomatic level. In any case,
over  all,  the  daily  press,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  personalities  loyal  to  the
government, was conservative and supported the political status quo. Only two papers,
held  by  native  Taiwanese,  distanced  themselves  from  the  official  line,  while  being
careful to remain within limits tolerable to the regime: the Zili wanbao (The Evening
Independent) et le Minzhong ribao (The Popular Daily). The Zili wanbao, an evening daily
which  first  appeared  in  Taipei  on  October  10  1947,  played,  under  the  aegis  of  Wu
Sanlian22, the role of a powerhouse in the handling of political news for the press as a
whole23. The Minzhong ribao, created on September 5 1950 in Jilong, and which set up in
Gaoxiong in 1978, adopted an editorial line closely based on that of the Zili wanbao, but
its quality was not as good24.
16 The government’s control of the media produced in the 1970s a blossoming of dissident
magzines  on the  island25.  In  1975  Taiwan  zhenglun (The  Taiwan  Political  Tribune)  was
created, and in 1979 Bashi niandai (The Eighties) and Meilidao (Formosa) were launched26. 
Bashi niandai represents the opposition’s moderate faction, while Meilidao was launched
by the radical faction Dangwai which, at the end of the 70s, went from demands for
democracy to demands for independence. On December 10 1979, International Human
Rights Day, Meilidao organised a gathering at Gaoxiong which ended in an explosion of
violence. Many members of Dangwai were arrested. Eight people were tried for sedition
by a  military  court,  and sentenced on April  19  1980  to  prison terms ranging from
twelve years to life. Among them was Annette Lü (Lü Xiulian), Chen Shiban’s running
mate in 2000, who was elected vice-president, and is running for reelection in 2004.
Chen Shuiban, a lawyer, entered politics at the time of the Meilidao trial. The dissident
magazines  of  Dangwai  have  played  a  central  role  in  the  expression  as  well  as  the
organisation of political opposition, and consequently in democratization.
17 In the early 1980s, the daily press market stabilised and the Lianhebao and Zhongguo
shibao groups reinforced their dominant position. In 1986, the total circulation of the
daily  press  was  estimated  at  3.8  million  copies27 ;  or  about  one  paper  for  every  5
inhabitants.  The  Taiwanese,  with  some  208  dailies  sold  per  1,000  inhabitants,  read
fewer newspapers than the Japanese, the biggest consumers of dailies along with the
Scandinavians (in the early 1990s: 562 copies per 1,000 inhabitants) or the Americans
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(244), but more than the French (155) or the Italians (118). The Taiwanese advertising
market continued to grow; between 1980 and 1987, the advertising revenue of the daily
press more than doubled. On the eve of January 1 1988, the circulation of the Zhongguo
shibao was  estimated  at  1.2  to  1.3  million  copies  and  that  of  the  Lianhe  bao at  1.1
million28. The totality of the dailies published in Taiwan by the two groups represented
80% of total circulation and corresponded to 55% of daily press advertising revenue.
After 1988, the profusion of titles conceals the concentration of the market
18 Baojin came to an end on January 1 1988, but an important step towards freedom had
already been taken with the lifting of martial law on the island on July 15 1987. The
number of registered newspapers, limited to 31 for almost forty years, rose to 122 in
1988 and reached 454 in 2001.
19 These papers however cover very different realities: advertisers, for their part, take
only twenty dailies into consideration. After 1988, the advertising market, which had
reached a degree of saturation, no longer showed the same growth as before. And in
1996, for the first time, television overtook the daily press in advertising revenue. The
growing interest of advertisers is explained by the growth of cable from 1995 on, but
also by the decline of the dailies’ readership. The number of people who read a daily fell
from 76% to 57% between 1991 and 200129.  This decline is thought to be due to the
young generations who prefer other media, such as television and the Internet, but
may also reflect discontent, in particular in the face of a drift to sensationalism.
 
1 The share of advertising between the daily press and television
Sources: Chuban nianjian. Zhonghua minguo jiushiyi nian (Publications Yearbook. Republic of China
2002), Taipei, Executive Yuan, Government Information Ofﬁce, 2003. Zhonghua minguo guanggao
nianjian 94-95 (Advertising Yearbook of the Republic of China 1994-1995), pp. 24-26, for the period
1988-1994. Zhonghua minguo guanggao nianjian 1997-1998, p. 164 and p. 169 for 1995 and 1996. 
Zhonghua minguo guanggao nianjian 2001-2002, p. 226 for the period 1997-2001.
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20 The lifting of baojin allowed the Lianhebao and Zhongguo shibao groups to consolidate
their positions. In 2001, the Lianhebao group took 38.5% of advertising revenues and
Zhongguo shibao 30%; between them they took 68.5% of the market30, compared to 55%
held before liberalisation31. First the two groups created new newspapers: by 1988 they
had established a foothold in the evening daily slot. Then they considerably increased
their pagination: their flagships, the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao, with 12 pages
prior to 1988, increased to fifty pages during the presidential election in March 200032.
Lastly both companies built new printing works in the north, centre and south of the
island:  to  meet  the  increases  in  pagination,  but  also  to  better  establish  themselves
locally through an increase in local editions, to facilitate their distribution and improve
their tapping of the advertising market. Obviously the financial and technical means at
their disposal (established distribution networks, for example), as well as their know-
how,  gave  them  an  advantage  over  newcomers.  The  oligopolistic  situation  which
prevailed before 1988 therefore favoured concentration.
21 The major resources needed for the creation of a newspaper and the keen competition
as a result of liberalisation explain the short lifespan of many dailies. An example is the
Shoudu zaobao (The Morning of The Capital) launched on May 4 1989 by Kang Ninxiang, a
key figure in the opposition, who was behind the magazines Taiwan zhenglun and Bashi
niandai. The Shoudu zaobao, with 12 pages at 8 $NT, looked « poor » compared to the
Zhongguo shibao, for example, at 10 $NT, which on January 1 1988 went up to 24 pages
and whose pagination has constantly increased. On August 28 1990, in a « Note to our
readers » on the front page, Shoudu zaobao announced that it was ceasing publication
« momentarily » for « financial reasons », and disappeared after some sixteen months
of existence. Yet it reflected without any doubt a section of Taiwanese opinion.
22 After  liberalisation,  the  difference  between  « national »  dailies  (those  newspapers
registered in Taipei) and the « local » dailies, tended to diminish. The quantity of local
news published in the multiple editions of the major papers, was equivalent to that of
the  local  papers,  sometimes  with  an  even  finer  division  of  the  territory  into
constituencies.  The  difference  between  « general »  and  « specialised »  papers  also
became increasingly blurred: all the Taiwanese papers filled out their content thanks to
increases in pagination, thus including more economic or leisure news than before.
Local and specialised papers, along with the government press with its unattractive
content, were hit hard.
23 The lifting of baojin sounded the death-knell of the dissident press as well, and affected
a paper like the Zili wanbao. On September 28 1986 was born the Democratic Progressive
Party which brought together various factions of the Dangwai: the opposition no longer
needed a journalistic cover for its political activities; moreover, the legalisation of the
opposition led to an improvement in the coverage of  its  activities  by the media.  It
became more  difficult  for  dissident  magazines  to  have  subversive  content.  The  Zili
wanbao,  whose  publishing  company  launched  a  morning  daily  The  Zili  zaobao ( The
Morning  Independent)  on  January  1  1988,  was  also  losing  ground.  On  the  one  hand,
because of liberalisation, its editorial line lost some of its originality and thus some of
its attraction. On the other hand, the lifting of baojin having made it possible for the
two major groups to gain a foothold in the evening daily sector, the Zili zaobao found
itself directly confronted with the two giants. The Zili zaobao closed in February 1999
and the Zili  wanbao disappeared in the autumn of 2001 33.  Lastly,  the general dailies,
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because of the frenetic competition between them, tended to fall into line with each
other. Liberalisation has therefore been a source of standardization.
The rise of the Ziyou shibao
24 The lifting of baojin led to the creation of new newspapers and allowed a new general
daily to achieve notoriety: the Ziyou shibao, a title which appeared on January 1 1988. In
the second quarter of 1996, the Ziyou shibao, whose circulation had risen from 185,000
copies in 1988 to over a million, declared itself to be the most widely read Taiwanese
newspaper, ahead of the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao. Thanks to liberalisation,
from 1996 on, there were no longer two but three major Taiwanese dailies.
25 The Ziyou shibao is none other than the old Ziyou  ribao based in Taizhong, and acquired
in April 198034 by Lin Rongsan. A businessman who had prospered in property, he had
one of the largest fortunes on the island ;  he was a member of the legislative Yuan
(1975-1979), and then of the Yuan of control (1980-1991) of which he was then vice-
president (1992-1993), he was close to President Li Denghui and became an advisor of
his in 1997.
26 The acquisition of the Ziqiang ribao is said to have cost 40 million $NT35. On the eve of
liberalisation, more than 600 million $NT were invested in the daily. Despite this, its
losses were estimated at 20 million $NT a month in its early stages. The Ziyou ribao then
took two initiatives which allowed it to balance its budget in the middle of the 1980s.
First it slashed the prices of its small ads. A line of text which was sold at 35 $NT, and
even went up to 45 $NT later on, was discounted to 5 $NT. This practice of dumping
allowed the daily to establish itself on the market: it first attracted large numbers of
legal advertisements, and then others, because of the lack of space in the big dailies,
due to limited pagination.  Then,  it  took advantage of  the rise of  dajiale clandestine
lotteries36. The Ziyou ribao published columns specialising in the forecasts of winning
numbers, inspired by the predictions of divines, mages and other fortune-tellers. This
policy not only brought it many new readers, but also an enormous increase in small
ads linked to dajiale, to the point where it created local editions to accommodate them.
Thanks to dajiale, the paper balanced its books: circulation rose from 30,000 to 40,000
copies and the small ads brought in over a million a month.
27 However  the  authorites  decided to  take  measures  against  the  clandestine  lotteries,
which had become a scourge.  The Ziyou shibao was obliged to restrain its  activities
linked to the dajiale ; its circulation and its advertising revenue decreased. In October
1986, the paper left  Taizhong for the district of Taipei,  which entailed considerable
costs and affected its performance. The Ziyou shibao found itself in the red again.
28 Before the liberalisation of January 1 1988, a complete reform of the daily was carried
out37.  The Ziyou shibao gave greater importance to « Taiwan » over the « Republic of
China », emphasized local difference (bentuhua), and « roots » (caogen). Its slogan, in its
promotional campaigns, was: « Taiwan above all, priority to freedom » (Taiwan youxian,
ziyou  di  yi).  Lin  Rongsan’s  daily  aligned  its  positions  on  those  of  the  Democratic
Progressive Party, thus setting itself apart from the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao.
In  parallel,  it  gave  unconditional  support  to  Li  Denghui,  the  first  islander  to  be
President of the Guomindang.
29 The Ziyou shibao experienced spectacular growth and, in June 1989, moved into the city
of Taipei. On June 15 1999, Lin Rongsan launched an English language daily, The Taipei
Times, thus creating the Ziyou shibao group. The spectacular growth of the Ziyou shibao
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was linked to its new format, the reason generally given by its supporters. But it also
owed much to an aggressive and much-criticized commercial policy, not to mention Lin
Rongsan’s sizeable financial resources and political support,  being close to Li Denghui
and very active in the paper from the beginning of the 1990s38. 
The exacerbated competition to be the leading Taiwan daily
30 After 1988, in the absence of an organisation to measure circulation in Taiwan39, the
main reference was the readership rates of the dailies, measured by a private polling
institution and aimed at advertising professionals40. The Ziyou shibao’s readership went
from 4.1% to 21.7% in 1996, the year in which he claimed the title of Taiwan’s leading
daily.
 
2 Readership rates of the three main Taiwanese dailies (in %)
Source: Zhonghua minguo guanggao nianjian 2001-2002 (Advertising Yearbook of Taiwan, The Republic
of China, 2001-2002), Taipei, Taibeishi guanggao daili shangtongye gonghui, 2003, p.233, and
ACNielsenMediaIndex.
31 Immediately after the liberalisation, the Linhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao were faced
with a steep decline in sales. In the space of a few months, both publications doubled
not only their pagination, but also their price: on September 1 1987, they went from 12
to 20 pages and from 5 to 8 $NT. Both papers’ circulation fell below a million copies
between January and April 198841. The rise in prices seems to have played a decisive
role in this fall: before 1988, 40% of Taiwanese subscribers to a daily subscribed to both
the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao; only 10% of them did so at the beginning of the
1990s. In January 1996, the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao raised their prices again,
from 10 to 15 $NT, because of rising paper costs, and saw another fall in sales. That year
the readership rate of the Lianhe bao went from 24.8 % in 1995 to 20.8 %, and that of the
Zhongguo shibao from 22.6 % to 19.1 %. In contrast, the Ziyou shibao, which held its price
at 10 $NT, saw its readership jump from 14.2 % to 21.7 %. 
32 But the success of the Ziyou shibao cannot be explained by its price alone. In July 1997,
the monthly Tianxia published a dossier criticising the methods used by Lin Rongsan’s
daily to obtain its good results, in particular the large-scale distribution of free copies42.
The Ziyou shibao was said to distribute up to 300,000 copies free; the Lianhe bao and the
Zhongguo shibao, for their part, up to 100,000 copies43. Meanwhile the Ziyou shibao had
adopted an aggressive distribution policy, buying over the employees of the Lianhe bao
and the Zhongguo shibao distribution network by paying them better. In the centre of
the island, the Ziyou shibao is said to have used the distribution networks of its two
competitors,  by  arranging  for  every  subscriber  to  the  Lianhe  bao and  the  Zhongguo
shibao to be also distributed, free of charge, a copy of Ziyou shinbao. When in 1996 the
price of the first two papers rose from 10 to 15 $NT, many of those who previously
received the Ziyou shibao free of charge, subscribed to it at its unchanged price of 10
$NT.
33 The  final  objective  of  this  policy  of  low  cover  prices  and  distribution  of  free  copies  is  the
advertising  market;  the  readership  rate,  which  is  the  point  of  reference  for  advertising
professionals, serves in particular to set the price of advertisements. When the results of the first
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quarter of 1996 were published, the Ziyou shibao raised its advertising rates. At the end of May
1997,  after  having registered the  highest  readership rates  for  four  consecutive  quarters,  the
Ziyou shibao aligned its prices on those of the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao.  The
Ziyou shibao’s turnover, which was less than 2 billion $NT in 1995, was said to have risen to
around 2.9 billion in 1996, most of the rise being due to increased advertising revenue. However,
according to Tianxia, the Ziyou shibao remained in the red44. The Lianhe bao, whose turnover
was said to be around 8.9 billion $NT in 1996, showed a profit of more than 700 million, and the
Zhongguo shibao a profit of 20 million $NT on a turnover of 8 billion. Faced with the rise of the
Ziyou shibao, the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao were said to distribute up to 100,000
free copies each, which amounted to costs of  25 to 30 million $NT per month. They also launched
spectacular promotion campaigns, based on those of the Ziyou shibao45. Smaller papers, such as
the local dailies, were severely affected by the fierce struggle between the three majors.
34 After the publication of the dossier by Tianxia in July 1997, the Ziyou shibao sued the
mamgazine for libel, but lost the case. The verdict was handed down on December 23
1999:  Tianxia  was  found  not  guilty,  the  court  deciding  that  the  magazine  had  not
intented  to  cause  harm.  Meanwhile  the  debate  had  shifted  — somewhat
hypocritically — onto the question freedom of the press, along the lines of: how far can
a  news  organ  push  criticism without  being  penalised  by  the  authorities?  Once  the
verdict  was  made public  the  Lianhebao and Zhongguo shibao groups congratulated
themselves on the prevalence of press freedom in Taiwan. After 1996, the Ziyou shibao
remained the leading Taiwanese daily ; but from 1999 on, its readership began to erode.
Also its advertising revenues remains smaller than that of its competitors: in 2001 they
amounted to 18 % of the market, as against 25 % for the Lianhe bao and 24 % for the
Zhongguo shibao.
35 Another  consequence  of  the  fierce  competition  born  of  liberalisation  was  an
increasingly marked propensity to sensationalism, in order to entice readers. The lack
of press ethics can also be explained by the growth in the numbers of newspapers; after
liberalisation  the  various  media  recruited  massively,  leading  to  a  lack  of
professionalism among journalists, some of whom had no training.
36 In 1997, in order to counter the erosion in its readership, the Zhongguo shibao resorted
to  a  change  in  editorial  policy  with  disastrous  results.  In  1995,  the  Hong  Kong
businessman Jimmy Lai (Li Zhiying) had launched the daily Pingguo ribao (The Apple)
in the British colony, which by 1996, was threatening the leading Dongfang ribao (The
Orient)46. In early 1997, the directors of the Zhongguo shibao, impressed by this success,
undertook a radical reform inspired by the Hong Kong daily. The Zhongguo shibao set
out to seduce the Taiwanese by choosing a more « popular » orientation. In February-
March  1997,  short  news  items  appeared  on  the  front  page.  On  pages  2  and  3,
traditionally reserved for important news, people features cropped up.
37 This new editorial policy lasted until the aftermath of the kidnapping of the daughter
of a television star, who was murdered by her kidnappers, and whose body was found
on 28 April 1997. The Zhongguo shibao published on its front page a photograph of the
body, with a closeup of the hand from which the kidnappers had severed a finger, and,
on page 2, a romanticized article about the case. This treatment of the news raised an
outcry on the island; a number of scandalised readers protested and cancelled their
subscriptions. The Zhongguo shibao was stigmatized in the schools of journalism. After
this case, the daily abandoned its new editorial line.
The consequences of democratisation on Taiwan’s daily press
China Perspectives, 51 | january-february 2004
9
Relations between the press and the authorities, and the boycott of the Lianhe bao in
1992
38 The coming to power of Li Denghui in 1988 marked a change in relations between the
authorities and the media: the traditional themes of « the national interest » and of
« the mission of the press » were repaced by « the importance of establishing a modern
society and the rule of law », to quote the President’s own words during an interview
with media  owners  who were members  of  the Guomindang on April  19  1989.  Even
though the media’s role as « guide of public opinion » was still mentioned, after 1988,
they were no longer asked so much to promote the policy of the Guomindang or of the
State, as to respect certain ethical criteria.
39 In  a  text  published  on  Spetember  1  1989  in  the  Zhongyang  ribao, and  entitled
« Observations  and  suggestions  to  the  media  after  the  lifting  of  martial  law »,  the
Director  of  the  Government  Information  Office  (GIO),  Shao  Yuming  called  for  self-
regulation  of  the  media :  « One  can  distinguish  self-regulation  from  the  discipline
imposed by regulations.  Discipline stems from the laws,  codes and pressure groups
which defend the public interest. These two forms of discipline are not incompatible,
but the former is better… for it has no influence on the freedom of the press. Where
discipline is concerned we should first reinforce the role of the Media Council47. The
government is in fact under the surveillance of the media, and it is not suitable for the
government to use administrative means or the law to punish them. That would raise
criticisms about freedom of the press being hampered ». It was one of the first times
that a member of the government looked upon the media as an independent power
— whose functions include keeping an eye on the government — and declared that the
government should not intervene in the area of the media48.
40 After the lifting of martial law and up to the abrogation of the Law on publications in
1999, the GIO, which still had the power to monitor the press, only claimed a restricted
role.  According to its Director,  Shao Yuming: « The GIO has contributed to national
policy over some forty years. However, in parallel with the democratic development of
our country,  the GIO’s  role should be simplified:  instead of  being both government
spokesman, in charge of political propaganda and responsible for press regulation, it
should  only  keep  its  function  as  government  spokesman.  We  should  leave  press
regulation  to  the  press  itself.  A  civil  entity  such  as  the  press  should  be  regulated
according to its own norms and professional ethics, and not by the government »49. 
41 According to Zhu Jiying,  Director of  the Guomindang’s  Cultural  Affairs Department,
which is  to  say  the  party’s  propaganda,  « in  a  democratic  society,  the  press  is  the
spokesman of the public and represents the public’s interests. I believe that the role of
the party’s  spokesman is  to provide information,  not to control  the news.  He must
manage information, not control it. He must explain the party’s policy to the media and
relay public opinion to his superiors. The rigid, domineering political style is out of
date »50.
42 However, while the press had more freedom than ever before, one daily, the Lianhe bao,
had all  sorts of  problems with the authorities.  Created in 1951,  and viscerally anti-
communist, the Lianhe bao distinguished itself from the 1970s onwards by its hostility to
the Dangwai51, whereas in the early 1960s it had been in favour of the creation of an
opposition  party.  While  continuing  to  state  its  attachment  to  democracy  and  to  a
multiparty system, the daily adopted a hard-line attitude towards the Dangwai, which
initially called for the democratization, and then — as it became more radical — the
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independence of Taiwan: the Lianhe bao claimed to support the Republic of China and
its founding dogma, particularly the fight against communism and the reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland « under the banner of democracy ». By the end of the 1970s,
the Lianhe bao used the threats of Beijing, and played on the feelings of insecurity, in
order to combat the independence movement.
43 On October 29 1992, Li Ruihuan, a permanent member of the Political Bureau of the
Chinese Communist Party, invited representatives of the overseas Chinese media, from
Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Macau,  to  Beijing.  The  interview  drew  to  a  close  with  a
question  from  a  Taiwanese,  who  asked  how  Communist  China  would  react  if the
Taiwanese  independence  movement  were  to  become  a  threat  to  reunification52.  Li
Ruihuan’s answer was published the next day by the entire Taiwanese press. The Lianhe
bao’s front page headline on Ocotber 30 1992 ran:  « Li  Ruihan:  continental  China is
prepared  to  interrupt  its  economic  reconstruction  to  prevent  the  independence  of
Taiwan. Continental China will use « all means » to preserve the territorial integrity of
the country, and will go without hesitation as far as « shedding blood and sacrificing
lives » (…) ». Three other dailies gave over their front pages to Li Ruihuan’s statement:
the  Zhonnguo  shibao and  two  government  newspapers,  the  Zhongyang  ribao and  the
Taiwan  xinsheng  bao. In  the  Ziyou  shibao and  the  Zili  wanbao,  the  news  appeared
respectively on page 2 and page 3. The various Taiwan dailies did not therefore accord
the same importance to Li Ruihuan’s statement, and the Lianhe bao was undeniably the
paper which gave it the most prominence; but the difference in hierarchisation was not
great and the content of the articles — which was purely factual — was almost identical.
44 On November 11 1992, the Permanent Committee of the Guomindang met to discuss
relations between the two shores; one of its members, Shen Changhuan, brandishing
the Lianhe bao of October 30 as evidence, was of the opinion that Li Ruihuan’s remarks
proved that adopting the policy of « One China, One Taiwan » would lead the island to
disaster.  President  Li  Denghui  retorted:  « The  recent  statement  by  Li  Ruihuan  in
Communist China, as far as I know, does not correspond at all to what Mr Shen said.
Those  journalists  who  were  present  then  can  testify.  But  a  person  from  a  certain
newspaper,  on  his  return,  gave  a  frightening  account  of  it,  to  put  fear  into  our
population. (…) According to Comrade Shen, Li Ruihuan stated that he wished to set
Taiwan awash in blood and renounce economic development. In reality Li Ruihuan did
not say that …53. Li Denghui’s answer is surprising: on October 30 the entire Taiwanese
press had attributed the same remarks to Li Ruihuan. Li Denghui did not,  however,
state the name of the newspaper in question.
45 On November 23, fifteen associations launched a « Boycott movement to save Taiwan »
(tuibao jiu Taiwan yundong),  against the Lianhe bao.  The three most important among
them  were:  the  Association  of  Taiwanese  Professors  (Taiwan  jiaoshou  xiehui),  the
Presbyterian Church (Taiwan jidujiao zhanglaojiaohui), and the League of the Taiwanese
medical  world  (Taiwan  yijie  lianmeng).  At  a  press  conference,  the  organisers  of  the
movement invoked the struggle for freedom of the press. In their opinion, the media
clung to their editorial  lines in defiance of  any objectivity,  all  the more so as they
tended  to  blend  fact  with  opinion.  Moreover  the  organisers  called  for  « genuine
competition  in  the  daily  newspaper  market »;  the  newspapers  distributed  aboard
aircraft as well as those to which the public service subscribed were, they said, all in
the same vein. Finally, they severely criticised the journalists, as poorly trained and
under  the  heel  of  the  press  bosses.  The  initiators  of  the  boycott  stated  that  their
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movement was not political, that it was aimed at the media as a whole, not especially at
the Lianhe bao, but they targeted the Lianhe bao because it was the biggest Taiwanese
media, and because the articles it published on mainland China caused problems.
46 The  leaflets  and  other  materials  aimed at  convincing  people  to  participate  in  the
boycott explained that the Lianhe bao « harmed Taiwan’s stability » by making itself
« the  spokesman  of  Communist  China »  and  by  being  « so  to  speak  the  Taiwanese
edition of the People’s Daily »! These allegations, although surprising at first glance, are
less so if one bears in mind the pro-unification positions of the Lianhe bao. The attack on
the  daily  which  «  generates  fear  and  threatens  the  Taiwanese  population »  was
launched  on  two  fronts  simultaneously:  on  the  readership  and  on  the
advertising. Stickers  for  letterboxes and entrance doorways were distributed,  which
proclaimed: « In our house we don’t read the Lianhe bao ». The initiators of the boycott
tried  to  persuade  people  not  to  place  small  ads  in  the  Lianhe  bao any  more,  and
advertising companies and professionals not to buy any more space in it; in particular,
they  threatened  to  boycott  products  which  appeared  on  the  front  page  of  the
newspaper.  On December 3,  the boycott organisers placed an advertisement in four
dailies, the Ziyou shibao, the Zili zaobao, the Zili wanbao, and the Minzhong ribao which
stated: « In our house we do not read the Lianhe bao : if you advertise in it, it’s in vain ».
47 These four papers had supported the boycott as early as November 24, by more or less
adopting  the  movement’s  ideas.  Moreover,  on  November  25,  the  Progressive
Democratic Party (PDP) reacted favourably to the boycott, by deciding not to advertise
in the Lianhe bao any longer. On December 8, the organisers asked the Guomindang to
follow the PDP’s  example54 ;  three  arguments  were advanced :  the  Lianhe  bao was  «
commonly  considered  to  be  the  most  conservative  Taiwanese  newspaper »,  was
situated « on the extreme conservative right »,  a position in complete contradiction
with the « innovation » advocated by the Guomindang ; the Nationalist party  wanted
stability and prosperity, whereas the Lianhe bao was a troublemaker ; it asked people to
have confidence while the Lianhe bao struck terror into them, « so much so that that
even the leaders of the Guomindang are no longer able to put up with the ill-feeling
disseminated by the Lianhe bao »55.
48 On  December  4  1992,  the  Lianhe  bao lodged  a  complaint  before  the  Media  Council
against the Ziyou shibao, the Minzhong ribao, the Zili zaobao and the Zili wanbao, for non-
compliance with professional ethics in their coverage of, and their commentary on, the
« Boycott movement to save Taiwan ». And on December 29, it sued four people for
libel:  the  President  and  Secretary  of  the  Taiwanese  Professors  Association,  both  of
whom taught at Taida, the island’s most prestigious university; the President of the
League of the Taiwanese medical world; and a pastor of the Presbyterian church. On
July 20 1993, the four accused were found guilty: the first was sentenced to five months
in jail and the three others to 50 days detention. However they appealed and won: on
August 24 1994, all four were declared innocent. The Media Council, which on April 1
1993 had announced that it was postponing the publication of the decision it had come
to on March 25, in order not to influence the legal action under way, published it on
February 9 1995: it found it favour of the Lianhe bao against the other papers, which
were reprimanded.
49 The exact impact of the boycott is difficult to estimate, but it appears to have amounted
to a major shock. First of all on the psychological plane: years later, the managers of
the  Lianhebao  group  could  not  get  over  having  been  called  « communists ».  The
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participants  in  the  boycott  included  all  the  opponents  of  the  nationalist  regime,
whether pro-independence or not, on whom the paper had heaped criticism for years.
But also Li Denghui — who was President of both the Republic and the Guomindang —
and his allies: consequently a number of administrations cancelled their subscriptions ;
the airline Eva Air stopped distributing the group’s newspapers on its aircraft56,  etc.
Between 1992 and 1993, the Lianhe bao’s readership fell from 31 % to 27 %, a fall which
seems due to the boycott, for during the same period, the readership of the Zhongguo
shibao remained stable, while that of the Ziyou shibao jumped spectacularly from 6 % to
13 %. To the loss of readership must be added the slowing of the Lianhe bao’s advertising
revenues : these rose by only 14.6 million $NT between 1992 and 1993, where at the
same time those of the Zhongguo shibao grew by 59.5 million and those of the Ziyou
shibao by 48.5 million. All in all, the boycott seems to have caused considerable losses to
the Lianhebao group.
50 The boycotting of the Lianhe bao was only one episode in a wider power struggle. In
1990, Li Denghui, preoccupied with winning the support of the conservative mainland
faction of the Guomindang, had appointed as head of the government the former Army
Supreme  Commander  and  Minister  of  Defence,  Hao  Bocun,  who  was  close  to  the
directors of the Lianhebao group. This appointment had caused much discontent; and
the debates within the Guomindang about the policy to follow in relation to mainland
China exacerbated passions. The Lianh bao seems to have served, in some ways, as a
scapegoat. On the other hand, the attacks on the paper prove that it is also a major
player on the Taiwanese political scene. On February 27 1993, Li Denghui rid himself of
Hao Bocun and replaced him with Lian Zhan, a Taiwanese banshan57.  Thereafter, the
conservative mainland faction was increasingly sidelined within the Guomindang, and
native  Taiwanese  came  to  power:  on  August  10  1993,  there  was  a  split  within  the
Nationalist party, with the creation of the Xindang which essentially brought together
young  mainland  politicians;  in  December  1995,  Hao  Bocun  was  excluded  from  the
Guomindang, followed, in November 1999, by Song Chuyu. Li Denghui preferred Lian
Zhan as candidate in the presidential elections in 2000, which indisputably contributed
to  the  victory  of  the  Progressive  Democratic  Party’s  candidate,  Chen  Shuibian.
Moreover, Li Denghui’s attitude in the debate over independence or reunification has
always been ambivalent. One could judge as early as 1995 that there were two positions
on the  question of  relations  between Taiwan and mainland China  which contained
« numerous  elements  of  convergence »,  those  of  the  majority  current  in  the
Guomindang (the faction behind Li Denghui) and that of the Progressive Democratic
Party58. All things which, obviously, could only profoundly displease the Lianhe bao.
51 In the eyes of the directors of the Lianhebao group, the boycott was launched at the
instigation of Li Denghui59. At the end of the boycott, followed by the dismissal of Hao
Bocun, the Lianhe bao became an oposition paper, anti-Li Denghui. The daily accused
the  President  of  « anti-democratic  practices »,  of  being  « dictatorial »,  and  of  not
respecting the freedom of the press60. Its editorial position became radicalised, at the
risk of reflecting only a minority of opinion in Taiwan and of marginalising itself by
alienating  the  less  conservative  fringe  of  its  readership.  Indeed,  Li  Denghui  then
enjoyed  wide  popular  support  and  indisputable  legitimacy:  in  March  1996,  he  was
reelected to the Presidency of the Republic for four years, by direct universal suffrage.
Up to 2000, the Lianhe bao’s  editorials displayed a belligerent opposition verging on
hysteria, with regard to Li Denghui. Under Chiang Kai-shek, a newspaper so virulent
towards  the  authorities  would  not  have  survived.  Thus,  freedom  of  the  press  now
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indisputably prevailed in Taiwan;  the newspapers participated fully  in a  sometimes
intense political debate.
The Presidential election in March 2000
52 In March 2000, the victory of Shen Shuibian, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)
candidate  in  the  Presidential  election,  brought  to  an  end  over  half  a  century  of
Nationalist  government in Taiwan.  His  two main rivals  were Lian Zhan,  the official
Guomindang candidate, and Song Chuyu, who had been excluded from the Nationalist
Party and ran as an independent61. Chen Shuibian obtained 39.3 % of the vote, barely
300,000 votes more than Song Chuyu who received 36.8 % of the vote, but far ahead of
Lian Zhan with 23.1 % of the vote62. In March 2004, Chen Shuibian, who is seeking a
second term with his running mate Annette Lü, will once again have as main rivals Lian
Zhan candidate for President, allied this time with Song Chuyu, who is running for vice-
president.
53 During the presidential election in 2000, the Ziyou shibao, the Zhongguo shibao and the
Lianhe  bao devoted  comparable  space  to  the  event.  The  Zhongyang  ribao,  the
Guomindang daily, on the other hand devoted a proportionately much larger space to
the election, because of its low pagination63. The four generalist Taiwanese newspapers
devoted  their  front  pages  to  the  presidential  election,  with  pages  2  and  3  being
traditionally where important news appears. We have studied the first three pages of
these four dailies from March 13 to 19, which is to say before and after the results of
the  election  were  made  known,  on  March  19.  All  the  articles  on  the  front  page
concerning  the  election  were  taken  into  account,  but  only  the  headlines  and  the
editorials  on  the  two  following  pages.  We  estimated  each  time  whether  they  were
partisan or not,  and if  so in whose favour, and we measured their surface area.  By
adding up the positive and negative occurrences of  each candidate,  we determined
which of the three candidate each paper favoured. The surfaces areas corresponding to
the occurrences allowed us to refine the result64, on the hypothesis that an occurrence
equivalent to a small surface has less impact than another which equals a large surface ;
moreover, a big surface devoted to a candidate, even if it judges him negatively, gives
him notoriety,  and even recognition,  in  virtue  of  the  principle  dear  to  advertising
professionals according to which it is better to be criticised than to be ignored, the
main thing being to « exist in  the media ». Finally the proportion of neutral surface
area to the total area studied made it possible for us to evaluate whether a newspaper
was fairly « engagé » or not.
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3 The presidential election's coverage from Monday March 13 to Thursday March 23, 2000
Source: Edited by the author 
54 The  Ziyou  shibao  was  resolutely  in  favour  of  Lian  Zhan,  the  candidate  of  the
Guomindang. That the champion of Taiwanese nationalism chose to support Lian Zhan
rather than Chen Shuibian seems to be directly linked to the friendship between its
boss, Lin Rongsan, and Li Denghui. Lian Zhang shows a score of +26, with virtually no
criticism made of him. Meanwhile, the daily was very anti-Song Chuyu : when he was
mentioned at all, it was in an entirely negative way (-11) ; this is hardly surprising since
it is well known that Lin Rongsan and Song Chuyu have no liking for each other65. The
Ziyou  shibao’s  attitude  to  Chen  Shuibian  seems  to  have  been  more  mitigated:
predominantly negative before his election (+7 as against –19, between March 13 and
18), it became positive afterwards (+7, from March 19 to 23). Moreover, considerable
space was devoted to Chen Shuibian (9,178 cm2), compared to Song Chuyu (2,037 cm2)
and even to Lian Zhan (6 232 cm2). Lin Rongsan’s paper was rather partisan (only 39 %
of  the  surface  area  is  neutral)  and  proved  somewhat  opportunistic  in  initially
supporting the existing authorities’ candidate, and then rowing in behind the winner.
55 The Zhongguo shibao was not very partisan: close to 64 % of the surface area devoted to
the election studied was neutral. Surprisingly, taking into account the history of the
paper whose proprietor, Yu Jizhong, is a mainlander, a former career military man who
had been a member of the Central Committee of the Guomindang, the Zhongguo shibao
was far from hostile to Chen Shuibian. In any case, following the example of the Ziyou
shibao,  a certain optimism seems to have come into play: before the election results
were made known, Chen Shuibian received 6 positive versus 7 negative occurrences
and between March 19 and 23, 8 positive occurrences; amounting to a total score of +7,
as  against  +3  for  Lian Zhan and –2  for  Song Chuyu.  The  Zhongguo  shibao also  gave
enormous importance to Chen Shuibian: 6 791 cm3, as against 2399 cm2 to Lian Zhan
and 342 cm2 to Song. The other surprise, linked to the first,  was that the Zhongguo
shibao hardly mentioned Song Chuyu, and when it did it was negatively.
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56 The Linhe bao supported Song Chuyu, who racked up a score of +10 as against –8 to each
of  his  two rivals,  Lian Zhan and Chen Shuibian.  Once  the  results  of  the  vote  were
known, the paper continued to support Song Chuyu, but showed itself less critical of
Chen Shuibian. Over half of the surface area devoted to the election under study (57 %)
was neutral, without any value judgement on any of the candidates. Of the 11,274 cm2
of  partisan  surface  (43 %),  a  sizeable  space  was  devoted  to  Chen:  4 961  cm2
predominantly negative, as against 2,598 cm2 predominantly negative pour Lian and
3,715 cm2 predominantly positive to Song.
57 The Zhongyang ribao, an organ of the Guomindang, campaigned predictably, in favour
of Lian Zhan, the Nationalist Party’s official candidate. The Party’s daily wasn’t very
subtle: Lian Zhan racked up a score of +35, as against –15 to Song Chuyu and –17 to
Chen Shuibian, and only 27 % of the surface studied was neutral. Support for Lian Zhan
was seamless, with an entirely positive score, while that of his two rivals was almost
entirely negative. 9,063 cm2 of space were devoted to Lian, as against 2,990 cm2 to Chen
and 2,328 cm2 to Song.
58 During  the  presidential  election  of  March  200,  the  Zhongguo  shibao was  the  least
partisan paper, while the Lianhe bao supported Song Chuyu, the only one of the three
candidates to be a mainlander and the most favourable to Beijing. The Zhongyang ribao
and  the  Ziyou  shibao campaigned  for  Lian  Zhan.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the
Zhongyang ribao,  the Nationalist Party daily should be a campaigning paper. But the
Ziyou  shibao,  a  privately-owned  paper,  was also  very  committed:  it  was  much  less
neutral (39 %) than the Zhongguo shibao (64 %) or even the Lianhe bao (57 %), despite
what one might expect given its hatred of Li Denghui. After the election, the Lianhe bao
continued to support Song Chuyu, who, on March 31 2000 created the People First Party
(Qinmindang); and displayed redoubled determination against Li Denghui, who was also
at the source of a new political organisation, Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng (Taiwan Solidarity
Union), created on August 12 2001. 
59 In the run-up to the presidential election in March 2004, the Ziyou shibao is supporting
the incumbent president Chen Shuibian (green camp) whereas the Zhongguo shibao and
the Lianhe bao are for his opponents (blue camp). The fourth Taiwanese daily in terms
of circulation is a newcomer: the Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), launched on May 2 2003 by
Hong Kong businessman Jimmy Lai. He established a foothold in Taiwan at the end of
May 2000, with the weekly Yi zhoukan (Next), a scandal sheet which has been widely
talked about since its creation66. The Pingguo ribao, in order to establish itself on the
market, was initially priced at 5 $NT; moreover the Zhongguo shibao and the Lianhe bao
dropped their prices from 15 to 10 $NT on May 1 2003, while the Ziyou shibao remained
at 10 $NT. On June 1 2003, the price of the Pingguo ribao realigned with that of its three
competitors. Sold mostly by the copy, the Pingguo ribao, has a high pagination and is
studded with colour photographs: it contains about 80 pages as against fifty or so for its
three competitors. It publishes three editions: one for Taipei, one for Taizhong and the
third for Gaoxiong. The first pages of the editions for the south and centre of the island
feature short news items.
60 At the end of 2003, the Pingguo ribao, which apparently has more appeal in the southern
part of Taiwan, claimed a circulation of 400,000 copies a day. Its readership is estimated
at les than 10 % (9.8 %), as against 13,7 % for the Lianhe bao,  15,2 % for the Zhongguo
shibao et  19,1 % for the Ziyou shibao.  Moreover,  its  advertising revenues seem much
smaller  than  those  of  its  rivals.  The  Pinguo  ribao is  a  scandal  sheet;  although  it  is
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rumoured that Jimmy Lai tends to favour Lian Zhan, his daily seems likely to have to
play a much less important role than its three competitors in the political debate.
61 The  daily  press  in  Taiwan  is  confronted  with  the  same  problems  as  that  of  most
developed countries :  concentration of  the market  and resort  to  the sensational.  In
Taiwan, however, these problems seem exacerbated, becuse of the island’s past. Prior
to 1988, govenment control forbade the creation of any new newspaper; the permitted
dailies thus benefited from a privileged position. This situation gave birth to two big
press groups, that of the Lianhebao and that of the Zhongguo shibao. Even though new
competitors  have  appeared  since  1988  — in  particular  the  Ziyou  shibao and  more
recently the Pingguo ribao —, these two groups have maintained an important position.
The oligopolistic situation prior to 1988 favoured concentration after 1988.
62 Since  the  liberalisation,  the  Taiwanese  media  have  distinguished  themselves  by  an
almost  total  lack  of  professional  ethics.  The drift  to  sensationalism is  all  the  more
striking in the absence of any real legal barriers, in particular where respect for privacy
is concerned. This legal vacuum is partly explained by the legacy of the authoritarian
period.  For  almost  forty  years  the  Taiwanese  press  was  muzzled  by  means  of  an
enormous armoury of laws. The Taiwanese are therefore particularly suspicious of any
legislation, which might in their eyes hobble the freedom of the press.
63 The  political  transition  in  Taiwan  suggests  the  existence  of  a  positive  correlation
between a free and varied press and democratization. But it was dissident magazines
which  played  a  major role  in  the  expression  and  organisation  of  the  political
opposition, and not the dailies authorised by the authorities. The democratization of
the regime was to lead to the liberalisation of the sector of the media, which, through
their  participation in  the  political  debate,  then contributed to  the  consolidation of
democracy.
64 From the beginning, the Nationalist regime had tolerated the existence of privately-
owned  newspapers  alongside  the  government  ones,  while  ensuring  that  they  were
controlled by persons loyal to the Guomindang. These newspapers, subject to the laws
of the market,  distanced themselves from the subsidised organs of  propaganda,  for
reasons of profitability among others. In fact,  in the space of ten years, the private
press overtook the government press. However they did not support the authorities
any less: for fear of reprisals, but also because their directors shared the values and the
ideals of the Republic of China within which they enjoyed the status of notables. The
example of Taiwan in the 1960s should temper the optimism which could arise from the
present transformation of the media in the People’s Republic: the commercialisation of
the sector will not inevitably give rise to freedom of the press.
NOTES
1. Baojin means, literally, « prohibitions concerning newspapers ».
2. This was directive n°3148 which stipulated in its seventh point: « In the province of
Taiwan, newspapers and magazines have already reached saturation point. In order to
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save paper, new registrations of newspapers, magazines and press agencies must
henceforth be very strictly curtailed » ". Xinwen yewu shouce (Manual for the
information professions), Taizhong, Taiwan sheng zhengfu xinwenchu, 1983, p. 17.
3. The 1952 law incorporated, after four years of revision, the major points in the
Guomindang’s 1930 and 1937 laws on publications, prior to the 1947 Constitution,
which were in turn inspired by the Yuan Shikai law on publications of 1914, and the
Qing law of 1906.
4. The law on publications was amended again on August 10 1973.
5. To crack down on the press, the Nationalist regime had at its disposal a number of
other texts, not directly concerning the press, such as the law on national conscription
or the sedition law.
6. For half-sheet or tabloid papers, one and a half sheets is equivalent to twice as much,
or 12 pages.
7. Between 1951 and 1960, seven newspapers were given publication permits. These
however were publications with a limited readership, some of which already existed
before being registered.
8. At the end of the period of Japanese colonisation (1895-1945) there remained only
one newspaper in Taiwan which resulted from the fusion of 6 dailies, the Taiwan xinbao
(or Taiwan Shinpo). It was taken over by the provincial authorities and reappeared
under the title of Taiwan xinsheng bao on the day of Liberation, October 25 1945. After
the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan, a major part of the team from the Shanghai Shenbao,
which the Guomindang had taken over in 1946, joined the Taiwan xinsgeng bao. 
9. The Zhongyiang ribao, which was brought over from mainland China, began to appear
in Taipei on March 12 1949. Officially the paper had been created on January 1 1928 in
Shanghai. But in reality, it had appeared under the Guomindang government in Wuhan.
158 issues appeared in Hankou between March and September 1927. Wang Hongjun,
"Kangzhan qianhou shiqi baoye zhi yanlun jingshen" (Opinion in the press at the time
of the war of resistance against Japan), in Wang Hongjun, ed., Xinwen lilun de Zhongguo
lishi guan (Historical Perspective on Chinese Journalism), Taipei, Yuanliu, 1998,
pp. 397-460.
10. From 1945 to the early 1950s, between 910,000 and 2 million people left mainland
China for Taiwan. They became the mainland community on the island, a minority
within the Taiwanese population estimated to be 6 million people in 1946 and 7.87
million in 1951. These refugees and their descendants have monopolised power at the
expense of the islanders or native Taiwanese (Bendiren). See especially Fiorella Allio
« The dynamics of the Identity Issue in Taiwan » China Perspectives, N°28, March-April
2000, pp. 43-50. 
11. Institutional advertising at that time made up most of the advertising and appeared
only in the Zhongyang ribao and the Taiwan xinsheng bao. In 1954, and again in 1958, the
Association of private newspapers tried expand its demands to the political field.
12. In 2003, the Lianhebao group included five dailies in Taiwan : as well as the Lianhe
bao, an economic daily, the Jingji ribao (Economic Daily News) created on April 20 1967 ;
the Minsheng bao (Min Sheng Daily) launched on February 18 1978, and specialising in
daily life and leisure ; an evening daily, the Lianhe wanbao (United Evening News)
launched on February 22 1988 ; a newspaper specialising in people news and aimed at
young people, the Xingbao (Star) launched on July 25 1999. It also has three dailies
abroad: the World Journal (Shijie ribao) in the United States and in Canada, launched in
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1976 ; the Europe Journal (Ouzhou ribao) in France, created in 1982 ; and The Universal
Daily News (Shijie ribao) in Thailand, which was taken over in 1986.
13. In 2003 this  group included, as well as its flagship, the Zhongguo shibao, created on
October 2 1950, an economic daily, the Gongshang shibao (Commercial Times), launched on
december 1 1978, and an evening daily, the Zhongshi wanbao (China Times Express),
launched on March 5 1988. The Zhongguo shibao group also owns some magazines.
14. "Zhongguo shibao" sishi nian (Forty Years of The China Times), Taipei, Zhongguo shibao
she, 1990, 409 p.
15. The importance given to  education by the Nationalist regime was also dictated by
politicalconsiderations. It was a question of imposing Mandarin (guoyu) on the island
population, most of whom spoke minnanhua  and Japanese after fifty years of Japanese
colonisation.
16. Zhonghua Minguo guanggao nianjian 94-95 (Annual of Advertising in the Republic of
China 1994-1995), Taipei, Taibeishi guanggao daili shangye tongye gonghui, 1995, p.51. 
Zhonghua Minguo xinwen nianjian 80 (Annual of the Media  in the Republic of China 1991),
Taipei, Zhongguo xinwen xuehui, 1991, p. 202 et p. 271. 
17. In 1977, one had the choice of having a small ad appear in the Lianhe bao either
« nationally » or in one of its six local editions. In 2000, the Lianhe bao had 23 editions.
18. Hourly productivity of manual typesetting was about 1,500 signs for an alphabetical
language, as against 1,200 for Chinese. The productivity of linotype could reach 12,000
signs.
19. For the Lianhe bao, at the beginning of automation in the 1960s, hourly productivity
reached 4,800 signs. In the early 1980s, with computerisation, it rose to 7,500 signs.
20. Chen Guoxiang, Zhu Ping, Taiwan baoye yanjin 40 nian (Forty Years of Development in
the Taiwanese Press), Taipei, Zili wanbao, 1987.
21. Chen, Zhu, Taiwan baoye yanjin 40 nian, p. 182. This figure is most probably an
overestimate. In Chen, Zhu, p. 200, the total circulation, which continued to grow
afterwards, is estimated at only 3.5 million in 1983. 
22. Wu Sanlian is a key personality in the Tainan bang. See Gilles Guiheux, Les Grands
Entrepreneurs privés à Taiwan. La main visible de la prospérité, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2002.
See also "Zili wanbao" 40 nian (Forty Years of The Evening Independent), Taipei, Zili
wanbao, 1989.
23. After a reorganisation in 1981, the circulation of the Zili wanbao more than
quadrupled between 1982 and 1987, reaching up to three-quarters of a market
estimated at 300,000 copies.
24. In 1985, the Minzhon ribao was suspended for 7 days by the authorities for
« communist propaganda ». Just before January 1 1988, its circulation was around
110,000 copies.
25. The total circulation of opposition magazines is estimated at 150,000 copies per
month in 1978, a figure which remained more or less constant for the next ten years.
26. Ferhat-Dana Samia, Le Dangwai et la démocratie à Taiwan, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998.
Geoffroy Claude, Le Mouvement indépendantiste taiwanais, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997.
27. Chen, Zhu, Taiwan baoye yanjin 40 nian, p. 200.
28. The circulation of the Jingji ribao is about 200,000 copies, that of the Gongshang
shibao 100,000 copies and that of the Minsheng bao 400,000 copies. "Taiwan baoye
chuanqi" (Legends of the Taiwanese Press), Caixun, April 1987, n°61, pp. 150-269.
29. Between 1991 and 2001, the percentage of subscription sales in overal sales fell
from 62 % to 34.4 %.
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30. Zhonghua minguo guanggao nianjian 2001-2002 (Advertising Yearbook of Taiwan, The
Republic of China, 2001-2002), Taipei, Taibeishi guanggao daili shangtongye gonghui,
2003, pp.222-240.
31. In 1997, the two groups’ dailies took in 79 % of the advertising market : 48 % for the
Lianhebao group’s papers, whose share thus declined significantly in the last few years,
and 31 % for those of the Zhngguo shibao group.
32.
32 On March 26 2000, the Zhongguo shibao comprised no less than 80 pages. 
33. Another evening paper, Jinbao (Power), which appeared in Taipei on July 26 1999,
ceased publication at the same period. There remained the two evening dailies
published by the Lianhebao and Zhongguo shibao groups. At the end of 2003 the
evening paper market was struck by disaster: many readers bought these papers for the
stockmarket results, but the results were now given in real time on the Internet and on
the cable TV channels.
34. The paper, which was then called Ziqiang ribao, took on its new title on January 1
1980. The origins of this daily go back to the Taidong xinbao (The New Taidong Daily),
created on December 20 1948, which was successively transformed into Yuandong ribao
(the Far-Eastern Daily), Dongsheng ribao (The Voice of The East), Taisheng ribao (The Voice of
Taiwan), Dahan ribao (The Great Han Daily), before becoming the Ziqiang ribao (The
Reenforcement Daily).
35. Lin Ke, "Lin Rongsan, Wu Amin fenli jingying Ziyou ribao" (Lin Rongsan and Wu
Amin are doing their best for the Ziyou ribao), Caixun, April 1987, n°61, pp. 224-227.
36. The clandestine lotteries called dajiale (the happiness of all) pirated the official
Chinese national Lottery created in 1950. At each draw, seven tickets of the National
Lottery won 1 Million $NT. The clandestine palayers bet on the last two numbers of
these seven tickets. The phenomenon grew unbelievably widespread : on the day of the
draw, the island’s economy is ground to a partial halt, businesses went bankrupt
because of the gambling compulsion of their owners, swindles of all sorts proliferated,
to say nothing of other exactions such as the violation of tombs to obtain the winning
numbers from Beyond. The authorities were forced to adopt a radical solution: at the
end of January 1988, Lottery draws were suspended.
37. Editorial reform was carried out under the aegis of Yan Wenshan, a Taiwanese from
Gaoxiong, who had been, in particular, editor-in-chief of the Zili wanbao.
38. Another daily launched on January 10 1990 seems to be enduring: the Dacheng bao
(The Great Daily News), with the same market positioning as the Lianhebao group’s 
Minsheng bao. On April 18 1997, it divided into two different papers, one devoted to
sport, the other to entertainment. The two have since joined up again. This daily
belongs to Lin Xie Hanjian, a sister-in-law of Lin Rongsan, the boss of the Ziyou shibao. 
Both belong to the « Sanchong bang », Sanchong being a city in the district of Taipei,
northwest of the capital.
39. Prior to 1988, because of the quotas on paper and the limited pagination imposed by
the Nationalist regime, circulation was estimated on the basis of each paper’s
consumption of paper.
40. This was AC Nielsen.
41. Xi Xiande ed., Taiwan xinwen shiye wenti jiexi (Analysis of the problems of the
Taiwanese press), Taipei, Wenzhan, 1992, p. 124.
42. Diao Manpeng, You Changshan, "Di yi dabao, jinzi dazao?" (Does the number 1 daily
produce gold?), Tianxia, July 1 1997, n°194, pp. 60-78.
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43. The distribution of free copies has always existed, Tianxia explained, but it generally
amounted to 1 % to 5 % of circulation, whereas the Ziyou shibao was said to go as high as
30 % on occasion. The avalanche of free copies was also visible in the Zhonghua minguo
guanggao nianjian 1997-1998, p. 167: their number more than tripled between 1991 and
1997, rising from 1.1 % to 3.6 %. But the annual did not specify which paper or papers
originated the increase.
44. Between March 13 and 26 2000, the Zhongguo shibao published 427.5 pages of
advertising, the Lianhe bao 309.25, and the Ziyou shibao 253.5. Data compiled by the
author.
45. Such as the Lianh bao’s « 3-3-3 » operation: for 33,300 $NT, the paper, in association
with an automobile manufacturer, offered a 33 month subscription, with as a gift, a car.
In the course of this campaign, some 50,000 cars were given away, one third to new
readers, and two thirds to former subscribers in an attempt to win their loyalty. The 
Zhongguo shibao followed suit: in partnership with another car company it offered a
three-year subscription and a car for 36,000 $NT.
46. Jimmy Lai, from the People’s Republic, made a fortune in textiles with the Giordano
brand of clothes. After the events of Tian’anmen he went into publishing by creating, in
Hong Kong in 1989, the weekly Yizhoukan (Next). The Pingguo ribao, just like Next,
resembles the English gutter press, whose main representative is The Sun. But the
success of Jimmy Lai’s papers in the former British colony is also explained by their
irreverent attitude towards Beijing.
47. The Media Council of the Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo xinwen pingyi
weiyuanhui) is an organ for self-regulation of the profession founded in 1963, but devoid
of any real power.
48. Shuang George Kuo-ning, Political Communication and Political Culture : Government and
Press Relations in Taiwan, doctoral thesis in philosophy, University of Maryland, 1993,
p. 167.
49. Shao Yuming, "Tan zhengfu fayanren de yunzuo" (On the functioning of the
government’s spokesman), in "Fayanren yu gongong guanxi zhuanji" (Dossier on
spokesmen and public relations), Baoxue, February 1991, vol.VIII, n°4, pp. 20-23.
50. Kuai Liang, "Zhengdang fayanren mianmianguan — Fang Guomindang wengonghui
Zhu Jiying zhuren tan zhengdang fayanren" (Spokesman of a political party: Interview
with Zhu Jiying, Director of the department of Cultural Affairs of the Guomindang), 
Baoxue, February 1991, pp. 24-28.
51. See Huang Nian ed., "Lianhe bao" sishi nian (Forty Years of the Lianhe bao), Taipei,
Lianjing, 1991, 255 p.; Wang Limei, Baoren Wang Tiwu. Lianhebao de gushi (Press Baron
Wang Tiwu. The History of the Lianhebao group), Taipei, Tianxia wenhua, 1994, 429 p.;
Wang Tiwu, Wo yu xinwen shiye (Journalism and I), Taipei, Lianjing, 1991, 231 p. ; as well
as Lin Fumei, Taiwan zhengjing xiluo zhongde baoye fazhan. Yi Lianhe bao wei li, tantao meijie
shuangyuan tezhi dui baoye zuzhi zuowei de yingxiang (The development of the press in the
political and economic framework of Taiwan. Research into the double nature of the
media and its impact on the organisation of the press, using the example of the Lianhe
bao), doctoral thesis, Institute of Research into Journalism, National Political Science
University, Taipei, 1998.
52. The President of a daily in Gaoxiong, the Zhongguo chenbao.
53. A book on the boycott published by the Lianhebao group has been very useful to us: 
Rang lishi lai caipan (History Will Judge), Taipei, Lianhebao she, 1994, 195 pp. The
documents reproduced in the book do not seem questionable. However a certain bias
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springs from the very selection of the facts, since some have been chosen rather than
others… as for the commentaries, they do not  pretend to be objective, but seek to
explain the positions of the Lianhe bao. Pages 15-16 of Rang lishi lai caipan contain the
official report of the debate within the Permanent Committee, published by the
Guomindang.
54. This was in the midst of the election campaign for the legislative Yuan.
55. The complete text addressed to the Guomindang is reproduced in Rang lishi lai
caipan, pp. 54-55.
56. Its owner, Zhang Rongfa, was close to Li Denghui.
57. Those Taiwanese who had forged links with Nationalist regime, in particular on
visits to the mainland before 1949, are nicknamed banshan, i.e. « semi-mainlanders », a
reference to the mainlanders called ashan by the island’s inhabitants: litterally « people
from beyond the mountains ».
58. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Taiwan-Chine populaire : l’impossible réunification, Paris, Ifri-
Dunod, 1995, p. 84.
59. In the eyes of the Lianhebao group, Li Denghui’s involvement in the boycott was
direct: his nephew, Lai Guozhou, a university professor, is said to have taken over.
Interviews with the group’s directors in April and May 2000.
60. The  Lianhe bao complained in particular of being ostracised by the President : Li
Denghui is supposed to have favoured his friend Lin Rongshan’s Ziyou shibao, giving it
all kinds of information first, while « forgetting » to invite the Lianhe bao to press
conferences. The Ziyou shibao seems to have been often better informed than the
Guomindang’s Zhongyang ribao.
61. In 1989, Song Chuyu was appointed Secretary General of the Nationalist Party by Li
Denghui. But relations between the two men deteriorated rapidly. In 1994, Song Chuyu
was elected Governor of Taiwan for four years, and in August 1997, in the election of
the Central Committee of the 15th Congress of the Guomindang, he received the largest
number of votes. He thus became Li Denghui’s possible successor, and the direct rival of
his protégé, Lian Zhan.
62. As a comparison, Li Denghui’s score in 1996 (54 %) surpassed that of all the other
candidates together.
63. Between March 13 and 23 2000, the Lianhe bao whose average pagination was 57.72
pages, devoted an average of 8.9 pages per day (16.9 % of the surface) to the election.
The Zhongguo shibao with an average pagination of 57,09 pages devoted 8,3 pages
(14,5 %). Ziyou shibao, with an average pagination of 52,18 pages, devoted 9,2 pages
(17,6 %). Le Zhongyang ribao, with an average pagination of 27,63 pages, devoted 7 pages
(25,3 % of the surface).
64. When an article referred to 2 or 3 candidates, we simply divided the surface by 2 or
3, without any weighting.
65. The dissension between the two is said to date back to 1992 : while Song Chuyu was
Secretary General of the Guomindang, he did not support Lin Rongsan’s candidacy to
the Control Yuan. From this period also dates a tenacious grudge of Lin Rongsan’s
towards the Lianhe bao and the Zhongguo shibao, who had branded him a « racketeer ».
66. Next and Apple Daily, which Jimmy Lai owns in Hong Kong, are completely
independent from the Taiwanese titles.
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